
Funafuti, Tuvalu. the low-lying South Pacific island nation of about 11,000 people has been classified as ‘extremely vulnerable’ to climate change by the United Nations Development Programme. (Photo by Mario Tama/Getty Images)
Australia has just released its first-ever National Climate Risk Assessment, and some big numbers drew fairly predictable media coverage: First climate risk assessment finds 1.5m Australians at risk from sea level rise by 2050, No Australian spared and Apocalyptic report a ‘wake-up call’ on climate impacts: PM.
One NCRA finding that grabbed attention was on rising sea levels: “By 2050, the number of coastal communities located in high and very-high risk areas will increase from 8% to 18% due to sea-level rise. If current populations remained as they are today, this would represent an increase to 1.5 million people at risk.”
The NCRA drew much of the data from Australia’s Future Climate and Hazards Report, prepared by the Australian Climate Service. It provides the following metrics used in sea-level rise assessment in the report, drawn from climate models:
Note that these figures are relative to present day sea level, which is 0.2 metres above the 1880 levels.
So for planning and adaptation benchmark 0.94 metres above 2020 is the plausible high-end case? Well no, and that’s the problem, because in climate politics, numbers mean more than words; in general, both the media and policymakers go with the headline-grabbing numbers presented, and ignore the fine print. I saw no media coverage or public discussion of any number above 0.94 metres.
Abrupt (and difficult to project) changes in the Antarctic and Arctic could produce sea-level rises of two metres this century, but the NCRA process will ignore that risk.
Yet both the NCRA and the Hazards report actually point to something different and much bigger. After giving the above numbers, the Hazards report then notes:
“Under higher emissions scenarios, sea levels will rise by metres over the coming centuries. In addition, thresholds (tipping points) for the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets could be crossed during the 21st century… Please see the Tipping points and abrupt responses section of this report for discussion of higher mean global sea levels this century and beyond.”
And then this on tipping points:
To summarise, abrupt (and difficult to project) changes in the Antarctic and Arctic could produce sea-level rises of two metres this century, but the NCRA process will ignore that risk.
The reason given is that this outcome has “low confidence”. But that is not true: repeatedly, over the last decade, peer-reviewed scientific papers have concluded that glaciers of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet have already passed their tipping points, for example here and here and here and here. That is, the rapid disintegration of Thwaites and other West Antarctic glaciers this century is more a probability than a possibility.
For example, the 2023 State of the cryospherereport from the International Cryosphere Climate Initiative lays out the “catastrophic global damage” that would result from sustained warming at 2°C and the “catastrophic global damage” that would result., including the commitment to “between 12 and 20 metres” of sea level rise.
And in 2017, a US government report concluded that: “Emerging science regarding Antarctic ice sheet stability suggests that, for higher scenarios, a GMSL rise exceeding eight feet (2.4 metres) by 2100 is physically possible, although the probability of such an extreme outcome cannot currently be assessed.”
A decade ago, scientists warned that the long-term sea-level rise associated with a 2°C warming would submerge parts of Australia on which 25-50% of the population currently lives. Australian Antarctic scientist Andrew Klekociuk says five metres is possible this century. And our scientists have also warned that current greenhouse gas levels will produce 5-25 metres of sea-level rise.
So why did the NCRA not identify that a plausible worst-case sea-level-rise scenario could be two metres or more this century? Was it scientific reticence or political nudging? Who knows, but the reality is that this is the opposite of good risk-assessment methodology.
The best approach in such cases is as follows:
This is not just a theoretical issue, but a practical one, because in Australia we have repeatedly underestimated the pace and impact of climate disruption, and ended up with event impacts — fire, flooding, extreme heat — worse than was planned for, which have devastated communities. Extreme floods and rain events are often oddly described as a “once-in-a-hundred-years” or a “one-in-five hundred-year” events, suggesting they are unlikely to recur. But then they happen again, within a few years.
This shows the assessments of future climate risks are often too conservative, and so vulnerable communities and governments are underprepared. The NCRA, by failing to clearly identify a plausible high-end scenario to be used as a guide for future planning on sea levels, is falling into the same trap.